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Editorial Note: Context, Character, and Purpose of the Case Study 
This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
The initial research output consists of a case study series exploring online intermediary liability 
frameworks and issues in Brazil, the European Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam, and a synthesis paper that seeks to distill key observations and provide a high-level 
analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
case studies are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online intermediaries in the 
digital age.2 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research 
techniques, committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, 
actionable, and timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to 
contribute to a more generalized vision and longer-term strategy regarding the role of academic research, 
facilitation and convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional 
information on the initiative, please contact Urs Gasser, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, at 
ugasser@cyber.law.harvard.edu 
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1!Part of the research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh 
Framework Program for research, technological development and demonstration in the context of the 
EXPERIMEDIA project (www.experimedia.eu) under grant agreement no: 287966 and the REVEAL project 
(revealproject.eu) under grant agreement no: 610928, as well as the Flemish research institute iMinds 
(www.iminds.be).!
2 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers, 2014 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_ToTBKP5ITVWTl0UzV0U3B2RlU/view?usp=sharing. 
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Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the legal framework governing the 
liability of online intermediaries in the European Union (EU). The E-Commerce 
Directive undoubtedly constitutes the key legal instrument targeting online 
intermediaries on the EU-wide level. After outlining the key provisions in this 
Directive, the paper will analyze the Google Spain ruling as a case study.3 This 
ruling is particularly interesting for two reasons. First of all, it involves a type of 
intermediary (search engine) whose legal position is largely undefined at the EU 
level. Secondly, the Google Spain case concerns the position of search engines 
vis-à-vis the personal data they process. In this regard, it is an ideal case study 
with which to evaluate the interaction between the intermediary liability regime 
and data protection law. Additionally, it provides food for thought with regard to 
the role of intermediaries in the governance of the Internet. !
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3 CJEU, Google Spain, C-131/12, Grand Chamber, 13.05.2014, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=264438. !
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I. Introduction 
After introducing the liability regime for online intermediaries in the EU, this working paper 
makes a deep-dive into the particular position of search engines. The Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) has recently issued a ruling obliging search engines to de-link certain results when 
person-names are used as search terms. The so-called Google Spain Case also highlights the 
important discussion on the interaction between data privacy laws and intermediary liability 
exemptions. Using this case as the thread throughout the second half of the paper, we identify the 
core issues that are relevant and need further research. !
II. EU Regime on Liability of Intermediaries – E-
Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC 
In the European Union, Directive 2000/31 regulates the liability of online intermediaries on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce in the 
Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive, ECD).4 !
The E-Commerce Directive was proposed by the European Commission in 1998, and signed by 
the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in June 2000. Member States had until 
January 2002 to implement the Directive into their national legal orders.5 !
As observed in the preamble to the Directive, the development of information society services 
within the Community is hindered by a number of legal obstacles that make the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services less attractive.6 Moreover, “these 
obstacles arise from divergences in legislation and from the legal uncertainty as to which 
national rules apply to such services.”7 The goal of the Directive, therefore, is to create a legal 
framework to ensure the free movement of information society services between Member States. 
The Directive aims to achieve this by realizing two main objectives. In the first instance, it seeks 
to remove certain legal obstacles hampering the development of electronic commerce within the 
internal market. At the same time, it is also aimed at providing legal certainty and ensuring 
consumer confidence towards electronic commerce. The development of electronic commerce 
was considered a crucial factor that would stimulate economic growth and investment in 
innovation by European companies, and which could also enhance the competitiveness of 
European industry.8 !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L 178, 17.07.2000, 1-16.!
5 See more in: First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on the Directive on Electronic Commerce, COM(2003) 702 final, Brussels, 21.11.2003;!
6 Freedom of establishment (articles 49 to 55 TFEU) and freedom to provide services (56 to 62 TFEU) are intended 
to guarantee the mobility of businesses and professionals within the EU (See: recital (5) to the E-Commerce 
Directive). See more at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.4.html; 
See the full text of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. !
7 Recital (5) to the E-Commerce Directive.!
8 Recital (2) to the E-Commerce Directive.!
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The Directive only partially succeeded in achieving its objectives. Since the introduction of the 
Directive, e-commerce in the EU has generally grown.9 However, it is still less advanced than in 
the United States and the Asia-Pacific.10 For a long time cross-border activity remained low,11 
although steady growth can be observed in the last few years.12 Nonetheless, the European 
Commission has expressed the view that more needs to be done in order to achieve the 
Directive’s full potential.13!
The E-Commerce Directive regulates several aspects of information society services, including 
freedom of services, the treatment of electronic contracts, and liability issues for third party 
content, among others. In this section we briefly present the scope of the Directive before 
focusing more extensively on the intermediary liability provisions. !
A. Scope 
The E-Commerce Directive applies to “information society services.” Such services are defined 
as ‘”…any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at 
the individual request of a recipient of services” (art. 2.a E-Commerce Directive). The notion of 
“information society services” covers a wide range of services. Many of the economic activities 
that take place online fall under the scope of the E-Commerce Directive. Examples of the 
services falling under this broad definition can be found in Recital (18) to the Directive. They 
may include (in so far as they represent an economic activity): online contracting, services 
providing transmission of information via communication networks, services providing access to 
a communication network, hosting of information, as well as services that do not give rise to on-
line contracting, e.g. those that offer online information or commercial communications or those 
that provide tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data.14 !
The key elements in determining whether or not a particular service can be qualified as an 
information society service are as follows:!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and 
The Committee of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce 
and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 3.!
10 Ibid. p.3.!
11 5th Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, Consumers at home in the single market, European Commission, March!
2011, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/editions/cms6_en.htm!
12 9th Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, Consumers at home in the single market, European Commission, July 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer_research/editions/docs/9th_edition_scoreboard_en.pdf !
13 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and 
The Committee of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce 
and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 6. For the analysis of the 
remaining obstacles to the development of the e-commerce in the EU see also Commission Staff Working 
Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final!
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communication2012/SEC2011_1641_en.pdf; and Summary of 
the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and the 
implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf.!
14 See Recital (18) to the E-Commerce Directive for more examples.!
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● Remuneration15;!
● Distance;!
● Electronic means;!
● Individual request of a recipient16.!
The E-Commerce Directive also excludes a number of services and legal issues from its scope 
such as, for example, questions covered by the Data Protection Directive (art. 1(5).b).17!
B. Liability Exemptions for Intermediaries 
The E-Commerce Directive regulates the liability of intermediary service providers in Section 4. 
This part of the Directive contains provisions introducing liability exemptions for certain types 
of intermediary services. Only three types of services are covered, namely ‘mere conduit’ (article 
12), ‘caching’, (article 13) and ‘hosting’ (article 14). In order to benefit from these exemptions, 
providers of such services must comply with the conditions of each article. !
The liability provisions of the E-Commerce Directive reconciled two main arguments in the 
debate taking place between the Internet industry and EU policy makers at the time. On one 
hand, there was the concern that if intermediaries were to be held liable for third party content on 
similar grounds as ‘publishers,’ it could restrain service providers from entering the market.18 On 
the other hand, the European Commission recognized the role that online intermediaries could 
play in limiting illegal online content and, through that, improved public trust and confidence in 
the Internet as a safe space for economic activity.19 The balance that was reached was meant to 
stimulate growth and innovation of the newly born technology and provide positive incentives 
for further development, which would effectively contribute to reaching the goals delineated in 
the E-Commerce Directive.20 !
The scope of the liability exemptions in the E-Commerce Directive is horizontal. This means that 
the liability exemptions cover various types of illegal content and activities (infringements on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The element of remuneration does not necessarily refer to the specific way in which the service is financed. 
Rather than that, it refers to the existence of an economic activity or an activity for which an economic consideration 
is given in return. Information society services therefore extend to services which are not remunerated by those who 
receive them. This means that a service financed through advertising, such as for example social networking site or a 
search engine, would be classified as an information society service. !
16 The element of “individual request of a recipient of services” covers an activity of visiting a website. The 
transmission of data is initiated on demand, by an individual ‘requesting’ the URL or following a link.!
17 Additionally, the Directive does not apply to: issues related to taxation; questions relating to agreements or 
practices governed by cartel law; the activities of notaries or equivalent professions to the extent that they involve a 
direct and specific connection with the exercise of public authority. See article 5.1 E-Commerce Directive.!
18 OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee for Information, Computer and 
Communication Policy, The Role of Internet Intermediaries In Advancing Public Policy Objectives, Forging 
partnerships for advancing public policy objectives for the Internet economy, Part II, 22.06.2011, p. 12.!
19 Ibid., p. 12.!
20 See Recitals 1-6 of the E-Commerce Directive.!
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copyright, defamation, content harmful to minors, unfair commercial practices, etc.) and 
different kinds of liability (criminal, civil, direct, indirect).21 !
If the conditions for being exempt from liability are not met, this does not mean that the 
intermediary is per se subject to liability. The effect is that the intermediary can no longer rely on 
the immunity provided by the Directive. The question of liability is then determined under the 
applicable material law specific for the type of infringing content in each Member State.22 !
1. Mere Conduit 
Art. 12 targets traditional Internet access providers and backbone operators. The liability 
exemption provided in this provision refers to providers of ‘mere conduit’ services, which are 
described as:!
● Services which consist of the transmission in a communication network of 
information provided by a recipient of the service (‘transmission services’); and!
● Services which consist of the provision of access to a communication network 
(‘access services’).!
Recital (42) further stipulates that the exemptions provided by the Directive apply only to cases 
“where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process 
of operating and giving access to a communication network (…).”23 It further elaborates that 
such activities are of a mere technical, automatic, and passive nature, which implies that the 
information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information it 
transmits or stores.24 The services described in art. 12 are sometimes compared to postal 
services, which are similarly not held liable for the illegal content of a letter.25!
The ‘mere conduit’ exemption of liability only applies on the condition that the service provider:!
● (a) Does not initiate the transfer of data ;!
● (b) Does not select the recipient of the data; and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Helberger N., et al., ‘Legal Aspects of User Created Content’ in IDATE, TNO, IViR, User-Created Content: 
Supporting a Participative Information Society, Study for the European Commission (DG INFSO), December 2008, 
p. 220, available at: http://www.ivir.nl/publications/helberger/User_created_content.pdf.  !
22 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.10. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?doc_id=842. !
23 Recital (42) to the E-Commerce Directive. !
24 While recital (42) purports to address all of the exemptions of the Directive, one might argue that the scope of this 
part of the recital should be limited to the transmission and access services identified in articles 12 and 13. After all, 
the exemption for hosting identified in art. 14 does not limit its scope to either transmission or access services (see 
also Montéro, E., ‘Les responsabilités liées au web 2.0’, Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 2008, n° 
32, p. 367). However, the ECJ has held recital (42) equally applicable to hosting services: see European Court of 
Justice, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010 (Google France and Google v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
a.o.), paragraphs 113-114.!
25 Lodder A., ‘Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market, in Lodder A. and Kasspersen (eds.), eDirectives: Guide to European Union Law 
on E-commerce – Article by Article Comments, Kluwer Law international, 2002, p. 87.!
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● (c) Does not select or modify the transmitted data. !
The liability exemption for mere conduits also extends to the automatic, intermediate, and 
transient storage of the information transmitted. This is the case if the storage takes place for the 
sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network. Moreover, the 
information cannot be stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the 
transmission (art. 12.2). !
Despite the lack of liability of the service provider (when the conditions are met), national courts 
and administrative authorities may direct prohibitory injunctions towards a provider of a ‘mere 
conduit’ service. Such injunction must be in accordance with the law of the Member State where 
the case is decided (Article 12.3).26!
2. Caching 
The second liability exemption provided by the E-Commerce Directive applies to the ‘caching’ 
of information. The provision is targeted at providers of so called ‘proxy-servers.’27 !
Caching is defined as “the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information, 
performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the information’s onward transmission 
to other recipients of the service upon their request.”28 This exemption covers only information 
society services which consist of the transmission in a communication network of information 
provided by a recipient of the service (‘transmission services’) (art. 13.1).29 Just as ‘mere 
conduits,’ providers of this type of service can only be exempted from liability if they are in no 
way involved with the information transmitted (recital (43)). In addition, the following five 
conditions must be met in order for a service provider to benefit from the caching exemption (art. 
13.1): !
● The (service) provider may not modify the information as it would deprive him of the 
position of the intermediary; !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The matter of injunction towards an Internet service provider was discussed recently by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in the UPC Telekabel. The case concerned an injunction for the Internet service provider 
(UPC Telekabel) to block access of its customers to a website making available to the public copyright infringing 
materials. The Court ruled that an injunction ordering blocking access to such website does not have to specify the 
measures to be taken by the ISP. As long as the ISP takes all reasonable measures to achieve the result defined in the 
injunction, it shall not be a subject to penalties for breach of the injunction. These measures should have the effect of 
preventing unauthorized access to the protected material or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously 
discouraging Internet users. At the same time such measures should appropriately balance other rights at stake. See 
par. 64 of the ruling. See: CJEU, Case C 314/12, 27 March 2014, (UPC Telekabel Wien). !
27 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.8.!
28 Article 13.1 to the E-Commerce Directive.!
29 When comparing the caching exemption with the exemption for transient storage under the ‘mere conduit’ rule of 
art. 12.2, the wording appears to be very similar. The key difference between the caching exemption for transient 
storage and the exemption for transient storage under the mere conduit provision therefore is the purpose for which 
the storage is taking place. See Lodder A., ‘Directive 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, in Lodder A. and Kasspersen (eds.), eDirectives: 
Guide to European Union Law on E-commerce – Article by Article Comments, Kluwer Law international, 2002, p. 
88.!
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● The provider has to comply with conditions on access to the information; !
● The provider must update the information regularly in accordance with the generally 
recognized rules and practices in this area; !
● The provider may not interfere with the lawful use of technology that is used to 
measure the use of information; !
● The provider must remove the cached information immediately upon obtaining actual 
knowledge that the initial source of the information is removed, access to it has been 
disabled, or that a court administrative authority has ordered such removal or 
disablement. !
The liability exemption for caching does not affect the power of courts or administrative 
authorities to issue prohibitory injunctions in accordance with the national legal system (art. 
13.2).!
3. Hosting 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive provides the third liability exemption for online 
intermediaries. This provision concerns information society services consisting of the storage of 
information provided by a recipient of the service at his request. Typically, it concerns 
webhosting services that provide web space to their users, where users can upload content to be 
published on a website (e.g. YouTube).30 !
The storage by the ‘hosting’ service providers differs from the storage carried out in the context 
of mere conduit or caching mainly in terms of the purposes for which the storage takes place. In 
contrast to mere conduit or caching services, such storage is not merely ‘incidental’ to the 
provision of the transmission or access services.31 Storage may be provided for a prolonged 
period of time, and may also be the primary object of the service.32 In comparison to mere-
conduit and caching services, the level of passivity required from the providers of the hosting 
service is different.33 The Court of Justice of the EU specified that in order to enjoy the benefit of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.9.!
31 I. Walden in: Bullesbach A., Poullet Y., Prins C. (eds.), Concise European IT Law, Kluwer Law International 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 2005, p. 253.!
32 It has been said that this exemption was originally aimed at ISP’s providing space on their Internet servers for 
third parties’ websites, or bulletin boards or chat room services provided by the ISP itself (where the ISP only 
provides technical means for the users’ communication without interfering with the content being communicated 
between the users) (see: S.S. Jakobsen, ‘Mobile Commerce and ISP Liability in the EU’, International Journal of 
Law and Information Technology 2010, vol. 19 no. 1, p. 44). However, the exemptions provided by the E-
Commerce Directive are defined in functional terms (i.e. in terms of the activity being performed), not in terms of 
the qualification of the actor. While the European legislator arguably only envisioned providers whose services 
consisted mainly, if not exclusively, in the performance of operations of a strictly technical nature, the scope of the 
exemption may also be applied to other entities (provided the conditions set forth by art. 14 are met). As a result, the 
exemption may in principle benefit any type of service provider who stores content at the request of the recipient; 
including so-called ‘web 2.0’ service providers (see E. Montéro, ‘Les responsabilités liées au web 2.0’, Revue du 
Droit des Technologies de l’Information 2008, n° 32, 369-373).!
33 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.9.!
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the liability exemption, a service provider’s conduct must be neutral. The Court further defined 
neutrality as a conduct that is “technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge 
or control of the data which it stores.”34!
Such service provider shall not be liable for the information stored, on the condition that:!
● The provider is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or 
information is apparent – with regard to civil claims for damages, and he does not have 
actual knowledge of illegal activity or information – with regard to other claims (art. 
14.1.a); or!
● The provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove 
or to disable access to the information (art. 14.1.b).!
Interestingly, the Directive introduces different levels of knowledge with regard to criminal and 
civil liability. For the former, ‘actual knowledge’ is required, while for the latter it is enough to 
establish ‘constructive knowledge’ of the service provider. It is not entirely clear, however, what 
the boundary is between these types of knowledge. For example, the interpretations of ‘actual 
knowledge’ range among the EU countries from knowledge obtained through a court order, to 
informal notice by a user, which, however, should be sufficiently substantiated.35 Divergent case 
law across the EU shows that there is a lack of consistency in the interpretation of these terms 
and the following requirements for a valid notice.36 !
The exemption of article 14 does not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the 
authority or the control of the provider (art. 14.2). For example, if the service provider is acting 
as an employer or supervisor of the service recipient, it will not qualify for the exemption if the 
content was introduced pursuant to its instructions.  !
Similarly, as in the case of the ‘mere-conduit’ and caching services, the liability exemption does 
not affect the possibility of a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member 
States' regulations, requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement (art. 
14.3). !
Article 14.3, additionally, creates for Member States the possibility of establishing specific 
procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. The Directive does not 
provide any details for taking down or blocking access to content from article 14.1.b. In 
consequence, there are no procedures on how such processes should be handled by service 
providers, nor safeguards to ensure proportionality or due process of the removal or blocking. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Court of Justice of the European Union, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010 (Google France and 
Google v. Louis Vuitton Malletier a.o.), paragraphs 113-114. The European Court of Justice addressed the issue of 
neutrality of hosting service providers also in the L’Oréal eBay case. The Court ruled that art. 14 of the Directive 
applies to hosting providers if they don’t play an active role that would allow them to have knowledge or control of 
the stored data. Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C 324/09, 12 July 2011 (L’Oréal v. eBay), 
paragraphs 112 - 116.!
35 European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), C 324/09, 12 July 2011, (L’Oréal SA and others).!
36 See for example: BGH, 23/09/2003, VI ZR 335/02; Dutch Supreme Court 25 November 2005, LJN Number 
AU4019, case number C04/234HR; M. Turner(ed.) & J. Llevat, “The Spanish Supreme Court clarifies the concept 
of actual knowledge in connection with ISP’s liability”, Comp LSR 2010, volume 26, issue 4, 440-441.!
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Procedural aspects were left entirely to the discretion of the Member States.37 Some of the EU 
countries provided a more detailed regulation for the hosting exemption by introducing formal 
notification procedures (‘Notice-and-Take Down procedures’). Many, however, opted for a 
verbatim transposition of the Directive, leaving this matter unattended.38 !
4. No General Obligation to Monitor 
Member States may not impose on providers of services covered by articles 12, 13, and 14 (i.e. 
mere conduit, caching or hosting) a general obligation to monitor information they transmit or 
store (art. 15). The same provision states that they cannot introduce a general obligation to 
actively look for facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.!
An obligation to conduct general monitoring of content, if permitted, would counteract the 
limited liability paradigm.39 This is because intermediary service providers actively seeking 
illegal activities would no longer be neutral and passive in nature. Moreover, a general 
monitoring obligation could lead to censorship and consequently have a negative impact on 
freedom of expression.40  !
The prohibition towards monitoring obligations refers solely to monitoring of a general nature. It 
does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case, nor does it affect orders by national 
authorities in line with national legislation (Recital (47)).41 The Directive also allows Member 
States to require hosting providers to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected 
from them (Recital (48)). Such duties of care, however, should only be introduced to detect and 
prevent certain types of illegal activities, foreseen by national law.42 To the confusion of many, 
the Directive does not specify what exactly such duties of care entail. As a result, the boundary 
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37 Also in recital 46, the Directive stipulates that the removal or disabling of access should be undertaken in 
observance of this right and of procedures established for this purpose at national level.!
38 First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on the Directive on Electronic Commerce, COM(2003) 702 final, Brussels, 21.11.2003;!
39 OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee for Information, Computer and 
Communication Policy, The Role of Internet Intermediaries In Advancing Public Policy Objectives, Forging 
partnerships for advancing public policy objectives for the Internet economy, Part II, 22.06.2011, p. 15.!
40 Ibid. p. 36. See also Council of Europe, Human rights guidelines for Internet Service Providers – Developed by 
the Council of Europe in co-operation with the European Internet Service Providers Association (EuroISPA), July 
2008, p.3, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-Inf(2008)009_en.pdf!
41 Application of art. 15 differs across the EU in case of injunctions. For example, in Germany a host may still be 
required to actively monitor his platform for further infringing activity. See more in T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., 
Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007, p. 85.!
42 Prohibition of the general monitoring obligation was addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
two cases, Scarlet v. Sabam and Sabam v. Netlog. Both cases concerned an obligation to install a filtering system in 
order to prevent sharing of copyright infringing files. Such request was initiated by the Belgian authors’ association 
(Sabam) with regard to an Internet Service Provider (Scarlet), and to a Belgian social networking site (Netlog). The 
Court decided, in both cases, that an injunction requiring to install a filtering system for all information which is 
passing via its services or stored on its servers by its users would constitute a general monitoring obligation if it 
applies indiscriminately to all of the users; as a preventative measure; exclusively at the provider’s expense; and for 
an unlimited period, and if it is capable of identifying electronic files containing musical, cinematographic or audio-
visual work of which the applicant holds intellectual property rights, with a view to preventing those works from 
being made available to the public in breach of copyright. Court of Justice of the European Union, C-70/10, 24 
November 2011 (Scarlet v. SABAM), and Court of Justice of the European Union, C-360/10, 16 February 2012 
(SABAM v. Netlog).!
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between such duties and general monitoring is not clear. Recital (48), for this reason, can be seen 
as contradictory to art. 15.43 !
The prohibition of article 15 is addressed to the Member States’ legislators. They are not allowed 
to introduce regulations that would require providers of the specified services to monitor the 
information they store or transmit. This does not mean that service providers cannot take up such 
activities on their own. The prohibition should not be read as a prohibition against service 
providers monitoring information. Most of the service providers in the EU do perform certain 
monitoring activities to maintain a ‘civilized’ environment on their service. Voluntary 
monitoring, however, can prove detrimental. Exercising too much control could compromise the 
neutral status of the intermediary and, in consequence, deprive them of the safe harbor 
protection. The EU intermediary regime does not contain a ‘Good Samaritan-like’ clause.44 
There is no provision which explicitly protects intermediaries from liability should their 
voluntary monitoring prove imperfect. As a result, service providers are careful not to shoot their 
own foot by being overzealous. !
Article 15 (2) defines two additional obligations that Member States may impose upon 
information society service providers. The first provides Member States the possibility to require 
service providers to inform authorities about any alleged illegal activities of their users. Such 
notification would need to be given as soon as the provider becomes aware of the illegal activity. 
Secondly, Member States may also establish obligations on providers to disclose the identity of 
users with whom they have storage agreements. Establishing these obligations is not a 
requirement and is left to the discretion of the Member States.45 !
The regime laid out by the E-Commerce Directive has been in place for over two decades now, 
without any update or amendment. During this time, a number of issues have been identified 
with regard to its functions.46 The review process of the Directive was, therefore, long awaited. !
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43 Barceló R. J. and Koelman, K., ‘Intermediary Liability In The E-Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But It's 
Not Enough’, Computer Law & Security Report 2000, vol. 4, pp. 231-239, p. 232.!
44 Such as, for example the one offered by the US CDA, Section 230 (c)(2).!
45 The possibility of introducing an obligation to disclose the identity of recipients was questioned in the Promusicae 
case (CJEU, C 275/06, 29 January 2008, Promusicae v. Telefonica de Espana). The request for preliminary ruling 
concerned questions whether Member States were required to introduce such an obligation in order to effectively 
protect copyrights. Moreover, a question was asked whether such obligation could pose a risk of infringement of a 
right to respect for private life of the users. The Court ruled that the Member States are not required to lay down an 
obligation to communicate personal data in order to ensure effective protection of copyright. Moreover, the Court 
stated that when transposing directives into national legal system a fair balance needs to be struck between the 
various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order. In this case, the rights to protection of property, 
including intellectual property and the right to effective remedy with the right to protection of personal data, hence 
to private life. No guidelines how to struck such balance were provided by the Court. See more: F. Coudert, E. 
Werkers, In The Aftermath of the Promusicae Case: How to Strike the Balance?, Int. Jnl. of Law and Info. 
Technology, 2010, Volume 18, Issue 1, Pp. 50-71.!
46 T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, 
Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007, p.15; OECD, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, April 2010, 
p. 20; Barceló R. J. and Koelman, K., ‘Intermediary Liability In The E-Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But 
It's Not Enough’, Computer Law & Security Report 2000, vol. 4, p. 231; Commission Communication to the 
European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of Regions, A 
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III. Review of the E-Commerce Directive47  
Despite the repeated criticism, the European Commission only started the process of reviewing 
the E-Commerce Directive in 2010.48 The goal was to establish whether a revision was required. 
Following a stakeholder consultation, the European Commission released a report documenting 
the most often expressed complaints of the Directive in general, and the intermediary liability 
regime in particular.49 The bulk of the latter concerned fragmentation and legal uncertainty.50 
Additionally, some specific problems regarding the hosting regime were described. A more 
thorough analysis of the identified issues was conducted in the Commission Staff Working 
Document on Online services.51!
A. Criticism  
The Commission Staff Working Document on Online Services expands on the problematic 
issues identified during the 2010 consultation. It mainly focused on the still pending questions 
with regard to legal uncertainty and fragmentation. Attention was also given to the specific 
issues of the hosting regime and the notice-and-takedown mechanism.!
1. Legal Fragmentation  
Legal fragmentation constitutes one of the greatest obstacles for the development of e-commerce 
in the EU. Despite the guarantees offered by the Directive, online intermediaries struggle with 
the fragmentation of rules that apply once they are aware of illegal content or activity on their 
websites.52 It has been observed that the costs and risks arising from the coexistence of 28 
national legal systems constrain innovation.53 This factor discourages potential new players in 
the market and hampers development of online business.54 !
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coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services {SEC(2011) 
1640 final} http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 41;!
47 This section is based on: A. Kuczerawy, Intermediary Liability & Freedom of expression: Recent developments in 
the EU Notice & Action Initiative, Computer Law and Security Review, Vol 31. Issue 1 2015, pages 46-56. 
48 Public consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the internal market and the implementation of the 
Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/e-
commerce_en.htm!
49 Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and 
the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf!
50 Ibid., p. 10 – 15.!
51 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final!
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communication2012/SEC2011_1641_en.pdf;!
52 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and 
The Committee of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce 
and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 14.!
53 Ibid. p. 6.!
54 Ibid. p. 14.!
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2. Legal Uncertainty  
The most common criticism of the Directive refers to the unclear scope of the definitions of 
intermediaries.55 As a result, it is often problematic to establish whether some services can 
benefit from the safe harbors offered by the ECD. This is particularly the case with ‘new’ types 
of services (e.g. video-sharing sites or social networking sites). Other criticisms mention the 
unclear position of search engines in the E-Commerce Directive. Opinions on the qualifications 
of this type of service differ across the EU.56 Further, respondents to the consultation complained 
about the unclear conditions for exoneration.57 Terms such as “expeditiously” or “actual 
knowledge” are defined in a way that leads to different interpretations in various countries by 
different stakeholders.58 This makes the functioning of the internal EU market problematic for 
the providers of the online cross-border services, as well as for their users.!
3. Notice and Takedown  
Another issue is a lack of uniform rules implementing liability exemption procedures, such as a 
notice-and-takedown system, across the EU.59 This is considered to be one of the major obstacles 
for intermediary service providers, as well as for victims of illegal content, to exercising their 
rights.60 As mentioned above, the Directive left establishing specific procedures governing the 
removal or disabling of access to information to the discretion of the Member States. This 
possibility is delineated in art. 14.3, while art. 16 (and recital (40)) encourages self-regulation in 
this aspect. This however proved to be inefficient – only some countries introduced formal 
takedown procedures.61 The procedures that were introduced are not harmonized with each 
other.62 This leads to significant costs for all stakeholders in terms of both human and financial 
resources.63!
!
The differences between the existing procedures can be quite substantial. Only a few countries 
foresaw any defense mechanism for the content provider (‘counter-notice’).64 Very often a user 
has no means of defending what is a rightful use of the content. Moreover, the user might not 
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55 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final, p. 32 -39.!
56 Ibid., p. 26.!
57 Ibid., p. 43.!
58 Ibid., p. 32 -39.!
59 Ibid., p. 39 – 47.!
60 Ibid., p. 24 – 26.!
61 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p. 19.!
62 See more in the First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market, at 13, COM (03) 0702, (November 21, 2003), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/directive/index_en.htm#maincontentSec3 !
63 Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and 
the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 11.!
64 In particular Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Spain and UK. See more in: First Report on the Application of 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on the Directive on Electronic 
Commerce, COM(2003) 702 final, Brussels, 21.11.2003.!
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even be aware that a third party objected to the use of the content, and which was, as a 
consequence, removed from the website in question. In most EU countries there is no 
requirement for hosting providers to inform content providers of any actions taken against their 
content.65 These aspects of notice-and-take-down have been criticized on numerous occasions.66 !
!
These examples point out another weakness of the European intermediary liability regime. The 
E-Commerce Directive currently lacks any firm safeguards that would ensure the proper balance 
of the fundamental rights at stake.67 No guidelines were advanced with regard to the 
implementation of takedown mechanisms implied in art. 14. Most EU countries did not foresee 
any procedural safeguards to ensure compatibility of notice-and-take-down regimes with the 
fundamental rights to freedom of expression, right to conduct business, due process, as well as 
the principle of proportionality.68!
!
Hosting service providers can benefit from the liability exemption only if they ‘act 
expeditiously’ to remove or disable access to content upon obtaining notification about its illegal 
character. The decision to remove or disable has to be swift in order to exonerate the service 
provider from the potential liability. This often leads to ‘over-compliance’ with takedown 
requests. Specifically, it has been argued that this provision creates “an incentive to 
systematically take down material, without hearing from the party whose material is removed.”69 
This is because any thorough assessment of the illicit character of content is not in the interest of 
the service provider. Moreover, the current legal situation is described as an “inappropriate 
transfer of juridical authority to the private sector.”70 These two factors may lead to private or 
corporate censorship.71 Concern about a possible ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression in 
this process was expressed by a number of organizations, including the Council of Europe.72 The 
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65 T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, 
Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007!
66 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final, p. 45; Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic 
commerce in the Internal Market and the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 
12,available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf!
67 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final, p. 43 - 47.!
68 Horten M., The Copyright Enforcement Enigma – Internet Politics and the ‘Telecoms Package’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 22 Nov 2011, p. 48-50;, T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – 
General trends in Europe, Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007.!
69 Barceló R. J. and Koelman, K., ‘Intermediary Liability In The E-Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But It's 
Not Enough’, Computer Law & Security Report 2000, vol. 4, p. 231;!
70 Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and 
the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 12!
71 Barceló R. J., On-line intermediary liability issues: comparing EU and US legal frameworks, E.I.P.R. 2000, 111; 
The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe and Reporters Sans Frontiers, Joint declaration on 
guaranteeing media freedom on the Internet, 17-18.06.2005, available at: http://www.osce.org/fom/15657.!
72 Council of Europe (Council of Ministers), Declaration on freedom of communications on the Internet, 
28.05.2003, available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/documents/Freedom%20of%20communication%20on%20the%20Internet_
en.pdf; Council of Europe, Human rights guidelines for Internet Service Providers – Developed by the Council of 
Europe in co-operation with the European Internet Service Providers Association (EuroISPA), July 2008, available 
at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-Inf(2008)009_en.pdf, paras 16 and 24; T. Verbiest, 
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ongoing review of the Directive is aimed at tackling all identified issues, but it has proved to be 
very challenging. !
B. Notice and Action Initiative 
The 2010 consultation revealed that the majority of respondents did not see the need for a 
revision of the Directive at that stage. Many of them, however, expressed the need to clarify 
certain aspects of the Directive, particularly with regard to intermediaries’ liability for third party 
content.!
!
The European Commission also concluded that procedures aimed at eliminating illegal online 
content should lead to a quicker takedown, but at the same time should better respect 
fundamental rights (in particular freedom of expression) and should increase legal certainty for 
online intermediaries.73 Based on these findings, the Commission decided to focus specifically 
on these aspects and direct its efforts to developing a new European framework for combating 
illicit online content.74!
In January 2012, the European Commission announced a new initiative on ‘Notice-and-Action’ 
procedures.75 The goal of this initiative is to set up a horizontal European framework for notice-
and-action procedures, to combat illegality on the Internet, and to ensure the transparency, 
effectiveness, and proportionality of N&A procedures, as well as compliance with fundamental 
rights.76 In order to combat illicit content more effectively, the Commission also announced a 
parallel revision of the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.77!
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Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, Markt/2006/09/E, 
12.11.2007, p.15; OECD, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, April 2010, pp. 9-14; !
73 European Commission on Notice and Action Procedures, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/notice-
and-action/index_en.htm; !
74 Commission Communication to the European Parliament A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital 
Single Market for e-commerce and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} ;!
75 The main difference with Notice-and-Take Down is that in Notice-and-Action a broader range of actions against 
the content can be taken, providing a possibility for a tailored response (e.g. ‘notice-and-notice’ or ‘notice-and-stay 
down’); ‘The notice and action procedures are those followed by the intermediary Internet providers for the purpose 
of combating illegal content upon receipt of notification. The intermediary may, for example, take down illegal 
content, block it, or request that it be voluntarily taken down by the persons who posted it online’. Commission 
Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee 
of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online 
services {SEC(2011) 1640 final}, p. 13, ft. 49, !
  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF; !
76 Ibid., p.14;!
77 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of!
intellectual property rights. OJ L 195, 2.6.2004. Commission Communication to the European Parliament A 
coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services {SEC(2011) 
1640 final}, p. 15. See more on the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/directive/index_en.htm; Action Plan on the enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/action-plan/index_en.htm#140701.!
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Following this announcement, the EC launched a new public consultation, this time dedicated 
entirely to N&A procedures.78 In response, the EC received a great number of contributions from 
a wide range of stakeholders. They included businesses and business associations representing 
different types of intermediaries, as well as public authorities, lawyers, individual citizens, and 
members of the copyright industry and civil society. So far, the EC has not provided a formal 
response to the consultation and its results, even though a response was expected in 2013. As 
briefly summarized in the 2013 Action Plan, “the Commission services are working on an impact 
assessment of the notice-and-action procedures.”79 !
According to Brussels insiders, the works are actually more intense that the official sources 
suggest. After the 2012 consultation, the EC was preparing a proposal for a new Notice-and-
Action Directive. Such a Directive would address the problem of online intermediaries’ 
uncertainty without the need to amend the whole E-Commerce Directive. The proposal, 
however, has not yet officially surfaced.80 It seems however that the works have currently slowed 
down. Several commentators suggested that, in the light of the 2014 European elections, the 
proposal was (at least temporarily) withdrawn due to a heavy industry lobbying effort and 
general sensitivity to the issue.81 There are indications that the topic has not been abandoned and 
it will return onto the EU policy agenda after the 2014 European elections.82!
IV. Situation of Search Engines  
A. Relevance of Search Engines / Information Location Tool 
Services 
Search engines are a type of selection intermediary, also called information location tool services 
or referencing services. Their role is to map, order, select, validate, and valuate online 
information. By doing this, they can help users to navigate the Web with its abundance of 
information. By providing a way to overcome ‘information overload,’ search engines guarantee 
the free flow of information and deliver a crucial service to society. It could be said that by 
providing access to information and diverse opinions they participate in ensuring freedom of 
expression, as delineated in art. 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights.83  !
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78 A clean and open Internet: Public consultation on procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content hosted by 
online intermediaries, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/clean-and-open-Internet_en.htm!
79 Commission Staff Working Document E-commerce Action plan 2012-2015 - State of play 2013, Brussels, 
23.4.2013 SWD(2013) 153 final, p. 19, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-
commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf!
80 See: Open Letter to Commissioner Barnier, 
https://ameliaandersdotter.eu/sites/default/files/letter_commissioner_barnier_notice_and_takedown.pdf .!
81 Monica Horten, 2013, Notice and action directive to be blocked as EU backs down, 28 July 2013. Available at: 
http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/ipred/893-notice-and-action-directive-to-be-blocked-as-eu-backs-down. !
82 Recently, Commissioner Barnier indicated that the works on the N&A initiative shall continue when speaking to 
the European Parliament. See more at: Monica Horten, 2014, Notice of Action! Barnier to resurrect take-down 
directive, in Iptegrity.com 6 February 2014. Available at: http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/ipred/945-notice-of-
action-eu-commission-to-revive-take-down-directive;!
83 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 005, 
04.11.1950, Rome, retrieved from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. See also 
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Information location tool services, or search engines, are covered by the definition of the 
Information Society Service from the E-Commerce Directive. In Recital 18 it is stated that:  
“[I]nformation society services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to online 
contracting but also, in so far as they represent an economic activity, extend to services 
which are not remunerated by those who receive them, such as those offering on-line 
information or commercial communications, or those providing tools allowing for search, 
access and retrieval of data…”84 !
However, this type of service is not covered by any of the three definitions of the services 
described in Section 4 of the E-Commerce Directive. They are, strictly speaking, neither a mere-
conduit service, nor caching or hosting service. This would mean that the intermediary liability 
regime of art. 12-15 ECD does not cover, at least nominally, search engines (or hyperlinks). The 
Directive, therefore, leaves this issue unattended.85 Only in the Final Provisions of the Directive 
is the problem mentioned, as it appears on the list of topics that should be analyzed in future, 
during the re-examination of the document. In Article 21 the Directive specifies that: “In 
examining the need for an adaptation of this Directive, the report shall in particular analyze the 
need for proposals concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool 
services…”86 !
This means that, until now, the E-Commerce Directive had not specifically addressed the legal 
situation of search engines with regard to liability for third party content. As can be seen in 
numerous examples of cases at both the national and the EU level, this approach creates a certain 
amount of confusion.87 !
Some of the most active search engines in Europe try to deal with this obstacle (at least partially) 
through different, and possibly combined, strategies. In some cases, search engine providers look 
for a solution by providing localized versions of their services.88 This practice is especially 
common in the case of highly sensitive content, such as Nazi glorification – prohibited by some 
European countries. In the majority of the cases, non-European search engines design their 
policies in accordance with the national laws of their countries of origin. Given the fact that most 
of them are based in the US, this has led to a de facto application of the US regime, especially 
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Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of human 
rights with regard to search engines, (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 4 April 2012 at the 1139th meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies).!
84 Directive 2000/31, Recital (18).!
85 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p. 25.!
86 Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 21(2).!
87 Spain: Miguel v. Google Inc., Spanish Supreme Court [STS (Civil Chamber) of 4 March 2013 no. 144/2013]; 
Spanish Supreme Court, Civil Chamber, ruling of 9 December 2009, no. 773/2009; Spanish Supreme Court, Civil 
Chamber, ruling of 4 March 2013 no. 144/2013; UK: R v Rock and Overton, Crown Court, Gloucester, 06.02.2010, 
ref. no. T20097013; Belgium, Brussels Court of First Instance, 15.02.2007, ref. no. 7964; Germany: Deutscher 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), 29.04.2010, ref. no. I ZR 69/08;!
88 W. Seltzer, “The Politics of Internet Control and Delegated Censorship”, American Society of International Law, 
April 10, 2008, p. 3, accessible at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1496056. !
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with regard to copyright infringements (cfr. Section 230, DMCA).89 As a result, the search 
engines governance debate in Europe is strongly influenced by the US approach (which also 
became clear in the Google Spain Case).90 !
B. Search Engines Regulation Across the EU 
The E-Commerce Directive declined to address the situation of search engines with regard to 
third party’s content. This issue was left entirely to the discretion of the Member States. Some 
countries have taken advantage of this opportunity, according to the EC’s first report on the 
application of the E-Commerce Directive.91 The result is a variety of approaches across the EU. !
Some countries extended the legislation transposing the E-Commerce Directive in order to cover 
search engines (and hyperlinks). This result was achieved mostly by adding an additional 
provision that targets these types of services. Among those Member States, two trends arise. !
In Austria and Liechtenstein, for example, search engine services were classified as providers of 
‘access services.’ As a result, they were provided with a liability exemption similar to that of the 
providers of mere conduit services. The argument behind this classification was that “search 
engines generally do not edit the content they show in the results, are not the source of the 
information they link to, and are not in the position to remove it from the Web.”92 !
Other Member States, such as Hungary93, Portugal,94 and Spain95 have opted for the hosting 
model for both search engines and hyperlinks. This means that providers of these services are 
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89 The most popular search engines like Google, Bing and Yahoo! are US based companies. For Google’s policy see 
the Transparency Report FAQ: "It is our policy to respond to clear and specific notices of alleged copyright 
infringement. The form of notice we specify in our web form is consistent with the DMCA and provides a simple 
and efficient mechanism for copyright owners from countries around the world." 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#other_copyright_laws !
90 J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the legal 
governance of Web search engines, Academisch Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, defended on 23 March 2012, p. 70.!
91 First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal 
Market, at 13, COM (03) 0702, (November 21, 2003), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2003/0702/COM_CO
M(2003)0702_EN.pdf. !
92 See footnote 30 in: Van Hoboken J., Legal Space for Innovative Ordering: on the need to update selection 
intermediary liability in the EU, International Journal of Communications Law & Policy, Issue 13, Winter 2009!
93 See 2001. évi CVIII Törvény az elektronikus kereskedelmi szolgáltatások, valamint az információs társadalommal 
összefüggő szolgáltatások egyes kérdéseiről [Act CVIII of 2001 on Electronic Commercial Services and Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services] (promulgated 24 Dec., 2001), MAGYAR KÖZLÖNY 
[HUNGARIAN GAZETTE] 2001/153, translated in http://www.nhh.hu/dokumentum.php?cid=11961. !
94 See Decreto- Lei n.º 7/2004, de 7 de Janeiro, que transpõe para a ordem jurídica nacional a Directiva n.º 
2000/31/CE, do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 8 de Junho, relativa a certos aspectos legais dos serviços da 
sociedade de informação, em especial do comércio electrónico, no mercado interno; Decreto-Lei 62/2009; Official 
Journal: Diaro da Republica I, number: 48, Publication date: 10/03/2009, p. 01602-01602 (MNE(2009)51108) 
http://www.cnpd.pt/bin/legis/nacional/DL62-2009-SPAM.pdf !
95 See art. 17 of Law 34/2002 on Information Society Services and Electronic Commerce (Ley 34/2002 de Servicios 
de la Sociedad de la Información y de Comercio Electronicó) of 12 July 2002 (B.O.E. 2002, 166). For a short a 
discussion see R. Julia- Barceló, ‘Spanish Implementation of the E-Commerce Directive. Main features of the 
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exempted from liability if they do not have knowledge of the illegal nature of the information 
they are linking to. They must also act expeditiously in case they obtain such knowledge, for 
example upon a notification from an individual, administrative body, or a court. !
The third group of the EU countries left this issue unregulated, choosing instead to apply the 
general rules of existing law. The best example here is the U.K., which is waiting for the 
European Commission to deal with this issue.96 A similar situation can be found in Germany and 
the Netherlands, where the general rules of law, particularly tort law, are applied.97 Very often, 
this results in complex rulings of the respective courts on the subject matter.98 !
The situation of search engines with regard to third party content is therefore far from 
harmonized at the EU level. The level of complexity of the underlying issues and the varying 
national approaches create a situation of legal uncertainty that is problematic for the providers of 
these services. This can be illustrated with the variety of decisions of different European courts 
with regard to the legal situation of the biggest player on the European search market: Google.99 !
This climate of legal uncertainty and fragmentation could also pose considerable difficulties for 
new, smaller market players that very often cannot afford elaborate legal services to determine 
the liabilities of their particular business models.100 This could be considered an obstacle to 
entering the field and, as a result, could hamper innovation and competition in the European 
market.101 It has already been observed that the major multinational selection intermediaries tend 
to choose compliance with the US law, which provides them with liability exemptions necessary 
to ensure their lawful operation.102 Applicability of the EU legislation to the US based services, 
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Implementation of the Ecommerce directive in Spain’, Computer und Recht International 2002, p. 112. See also 
Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD), Statement on Internet Search Engines, p. 2 et seq., available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/statement_aepd_search_engines_/Statement_AE
PD_Search_Engines_en.pdf. !
96 DTI Consultation Document on the Electronic Commerce Directive: The Liability of Hyperlinkers, Location Tool 
Services and Content Aggregators - Government Response and Summary of Responses 6 (December 2006), 
available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file35905.pdf.!
97 See Sieber U., Liesching M., Die Verantwortlichkeit der Suchmaschinenbetreiber nach dem Telemediengesetz 
[The Liability of Search Engine Operators after the Telemedia Act], MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR], Issue 
8/2007; Peter Ruess, ‘Just Google it?’ – Neuigkeiten und Gedanken zur Haftung der Suchmaschinenanbieter für 
Markenverletzungen in Deutschland und den USA [‘Just Google it?’ – Novelties and Thoughts on the Liability of 
Search Engine Operators for Trademark Infringement in Germany and the USA], 2007 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 198 – 203. !
98 Germany: Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Jul 17, 2003, I ZR 259/00; Oberlandesgericht 
[OLG] Hamburg [Court of Appeals Hamburg], February 20, 2007, AZ. 7 U 126/06; Landesgericht [LG] Berlin 
[Trial Court Berlin], February 22, 2005, AZ 27 O 45/05; Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam, 15 June 2006, Stichting 
BREIN vs. Techno Design Internet Programming BV, case LJ number AX7579‘.!
99 E.g. European Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010 (Google France and Google 
v. Louis Vuitton Malletier a.o.); Court of Appeal, Case no. 08/13423, 26 January 2011 (Socie´te´ des Auteurs des 
Arts visuels et de l’Image fixe (SAIF) v Google France/Google inc.); The Court of Appeal of Brussels, Case no. 
2007/AR/1730, 5 May 2011 (Copiepresse v. Google); Court of Milan, Case no. 1972/2010, 24 February 2010.!
100 Van Hoboken J., Legal Space for Innovative Ordering: on the need to update selection intermediary liability in 
the EU, International Journal of Communications Law & Policy, Issue 13, Winter 2009.!
101 Ibid. !
102 J. Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007); U. Gasser, Regulating 
Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 124 (2006).!
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including search engines, has been debated extensively over the last few years.103 This issue has 
been addressed in a recent high-profile case at the CJEU Google Spain, which will be presented 
below. !
V. Google Spain Case  
The so-called Google Spain Case (recently before the Court of Justice of the European Union (C-
131/12)) constitutes an excellent example of the issues mentioned in the previous pages.104 The 
case raises crucial questions lying at the intersection of the legal regimes concerning 
intermediary liability, freedom of expression, privacy, and data protection.105 Interestingly 
enough, the Court’s decision hinged entirely upon the European data protection framework. In 
other words, the Court barely mentioned the right to freedom of expression and made no 
reference whatsoever to intermediary liability exemptions.106 The following section will give a 
brief overview of the main issues in this case when looked at from an intermediary liability 
angle. But before that, we briefly recall the main facts of the case. !
A. The Ruling107 
1. Facts 
In the late 1990’s a Spanish citizen was subjected to insolvency proceedings, which in turn 
resulted in a public auction of some of his property. Information about this public auction was 
published in a local newspaper (LaVanguardia), in accordance with an order issued by the 
Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.108 By 1998, all debts were successfully settled.!
In 2009, the Spanish citizen discovered references to the above-mentioned LaVanguardia article 
when entering his name into Google’s search engine. Disturbed, he asked the newspaper to 
remove the content in question. This request was denied, as the newspaper had a legal obligation 
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103 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law’, WP 179, 16 December 2010, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp179_en.pdf; L. Moerel, ‘The long arm 
of EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to processing of personal data of EU citizens by 
websites worldwide?’, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 34-35; C. Kuner, F.H. Cate, C. 
Millard and D.J.B. Svantesson, ‘The extraterritoriality of data privacy laws – an explosive issue yet to detonate’, 
International Data Privacy Law 2013, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 147-148; A. Kuczerawy, Facebook and its EU users - 
applicability of the EU data protection law to US based SNS, in M. Bezzi et al. (Eds.): Privacy and Identity, IFIP 
AICT 320, 2010, pp. 75–85.!
104 Court of Justice of the European Union, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, C-131/12, 13 May 2014.!
105 For an elaborate discussion on all theses issues, see: Alsenoy, Van, Brendan, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef 
Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google Spain”: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?. ICRI Research Paper. 
Leuven, Belgium: ICRI, September 6, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494.!
106 This is in sharp contrast to the Advocate General’s Opinion of June 2013. REFERENCE!
107 This section is largely based on a similar section in another paper the authors co-wrote: Van Alsenoy, Brendan, 
Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google Spain”: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril? 
ICRI Research Paper. Leuven, Belgium: ICRI, September 6, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494, 6.!
108 Audiencia Nacional. Sala de lo Contencioso, Google Spain SL y Google Inc., S.L. c. Agencia de Protección de 
Datos, paragraph 1.2, available at 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/doAction?action=contentpdf&databasematch=AN&reference=6292979&links=
%22725/2010%22&optimize=20120305&publicinterface=true!
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to publish this information. Unsuccessful vis-à-vis the newspaper itself, the individual then 
requested Google’s Spanish subsidiary (hereafter: ‘Google Es.’) to stop including this article in 
search results when someone enters his name as a search term.109 Google Es. referred this request 
to Google Inc., arguing that this is the entity responsible for the development of search results.!
In March of 2010, the individual asked the Spanish Data Protection Authority (Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos, AEPD) to issue an administrative decision which would (a) order 
LaVanguardia to eliminate or modify the publication so his personal data would no longer 
appear in search results; and (b) order Google to stop referring to the contentious publication in 
its search results.110 In July of the same year, the AEPD ordered Google Es. and Google Inc. to 
take “all reasonable steps to remove the disputed personal data from its index and preclude 
further access.”111 The request against La Vanguardia was denied, because – according to the 
AEPD – the newspaper still had a legitimate reason to process the data at issue.112 One year later, 
Google launched an appeal against the AEPD’s decision before the Spanish National Court 
(Audiencia Nacional) in Madrid. In March 2012, this court referred the case to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling.113!
2. Decision 
The Court of Justice issued its ruling on May 13th 2014. To the surprise of many, the decision 
entirely countered the Advocate General’s Opinion of June 2013.114 Put briefly, the Court 
decided that Google – and ‘search engine operators’ more broadly – do fall within the scope of 
application of European data protection law. After all, the Court declared, by (autonomously) 
retrieving, recording, and organizing personal data from third party websites, search engines can 
be considered ‘data controllers’ within the meaning of the data protection directive (95/46).115 
The Court also resolutely decided that Google falls within the Directive’s territorial scope of 
application.116 Following this first category of questions (regarding the scope of application of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Ibid, paragraph 1.3. !
110 Ibid, paragraph 2.1!
111 Ibid, paragraph 2.3.!
112 i.e. order issued by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Ibid, paragraph 6.2.!
113 At the risk of generalizing too much, the request for a preliminary ruling contained two categories of questions: 
(a) the scope of application of European data protection law; and (b) the existence of a right to be forgotten/erasure 
vis-à-vis search engines directly.!
114 In this non-binding, advisory document to the Court, the Advocate General argued that search engines do not fall 
within the scope of application of the data protection framework with regard to the content they refer to. Moreover, 
he claimed that the current EU data protection directive does not provide for a general ‘right to be forgotten’ vis-a-
vis search engines. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) Mario Costeja González, Case C 131/12, 25 June 2013, in particular paras. 100; 108.!
115 For the Court’s reasoning, see Ruling paras. 21-32 on the Material Scope Determination (‘processing’ and 
‘personal data’) and paras.32-41 on the Personal Scope Determination (‘data controller’). For a detailed academic 
analysis, see: Alsenoy, Van, Brendan, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google 
Spain”: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril? ICRI Research Paper. Leuven, Belgium: ICRI, September 6, 2013. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494, 9-19.!
116 See Paras.42-60 of the Ruling.!
From a practical perspective, this means non-EU intermediaries (or Internet service providers more broadly) will not 
be able to escape the territorial reach of the data protection framework when they are processing EU citizens’ 
personal data and have an establishment in the Union.!
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European data protection law), the Court dealt with the more controversial questions regarding 
the so-called ‘Right to be Forgotten’. In short, it decided that data subjects can indeed ask search 
engines to remove a reference to a webpage when their name is used as a search term.117 The 
lawfulness of the source material is not a condition,118 nor does the data subject have to prove 
harm.119 The Court did specify, however, that the right to erasure is not absolute, and a balance 
of rights and interests needs to be made.120 These rights and interests include, on the one hand, 
the economic interests of the search engine operator, as well as the legitimate interests of Internet 
users in accessing information and, on the other hand, data subject’s rights. According to the 
Court of Justice, the search engine’s economic interests alone cannot be a justification to 
interfere with the data subject’s rights. With regard to the balancing of fundamental rights and 
interests of Internet users versus those of the data subject, the Court did state that the latter 
override all others by default.121 In other words, the burden of proof seems to be on the search 
engine to establish that the interests/rights of its users weigh more than those of the data subject. 
The Court did provide some guidance on what criteria might influence the balancing exercise in 
casu: nature or sensitivity of the information; public interest; role of data subject in public life; 
time elapsed; etc.122 In any situation, it is important to emphasize that the data subject will still 
have to fulfill the conditions for exercising his/her right to object/erase123 and the search engine 
is only subject to data protection rules “within the framework of its responsibilities, powers, and 
capabilities.”124!
B. Particularities 
Even though entirely ruled under the data protection framework, the Google Spain (or ‘Right to 
be Forgotten’) case125 bears a lot of resemblance to the notice-and-takedown procedures that 
people are more familiar with under the intermediary liability regime (supra). After all, an 
individual – with certain rights vis-à-vis the information – demands an entity that is not at the 
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Following the ruling, Google has clarified that it will only comply with potential erasure requests when the search 
queries originate in the EU. Put differently, the takedowns will not be implemented globally (see: Sam Schechner, 
“Google Starts Removing Search Results under Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 
2014, sec. Technology, http://online.wsj.com/articles/google-starts-removing-search-results-under-europes-right-to-
be-forgotten-1403774023. This article also explains at least one regulator has expressed displeasure in this regard). 
Whether or not Member-States will deem this an appropriate reaction still has to be seen.!
117 Such a right would be based on the rights to object (14) and to erasure (12(b)) in the Data Protection Directive.!
118 Paragraph 88; 93-94.!
119 Paragraph 96; 99.!
120 Paragraphs 74 et seq.!
121 Paragraph 81; 97.!
122 Paragraph 81; 93.!
123 In order to exercise one’s right to object, the data subject will have to put forward ‘compelling legitimate grounds 
relating to his/her particular situation to the processing of data relating to him/her’ (article 14 Directive 95/46). The 
right to erasure can be exercised when the processing in question ‘does not comply with the provisions of [the] 
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data’ (article 12(b)).!
124 Paragraph 83.!
125 For a comprehensive overview of the possibility to request the removal of (links to) personal data by search 
engines, see: Van Alsenoy , Brendan, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google 
Spain”: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril? ICRI Research Paper. Leuven, Belgium: ICRI, September 6, 2013. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494.!
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source of the information, to remove it. Nevertheless, there are some important questions that 
distinguish this particular case from traditional N&T procedures.!
1. Notification 
As has been described supra, search engines are not explicitly included in the intermediary 
liability exemption regime in the E-Commerce Directive. !
However, Spanish law explicitly provides for a search engine liability exemption, similar to that 
for hosting providers.126 In the Google Spain Case, however, the Court put emphasis on the 
search engine’s own activities vis-à-vis the (personal) data and not the activities of the original 
publisher. The latter, after all, were legal.!
Once notified of a certain processing activity (i.e. the referral to a certain website upon searching 
for someone’s name), it was argued, Google cannot deny its responsibility with regard to that 
processing. It is therefore worth highlighting that in Google Spain, the rights holder (i.e. the data 
subject) did notify the search engine. When the company did not react, the individual eventually 
obtained a court order to have the respective information taken down. Therefore, when looked at 
from an intermediary liability perspective, Google would still have had to remove the 
information upon notification (cfr. the hosting regime). In casu, they did not even remove it after 
receiving a court order (cfr. mere conduit regime, where information has to be removed 
following such an order).127!
2. Taking Down Legitimate Information? 
One of the elements making the Google Spain Case so interesting and controversial is the fact 
that the underlying information – which is referred to by Google – is published lawfully. In other 
words, the information at its source is legitimate and the original publisher does not have an 
obligation to take it down.128 It is in this context the analogy with the notice-and-takedown 
regime falls apart. The exemption regime under the E-Commerce Directive focuses on the 
(illegal) nature of the content or the activities of the originator. The Data Protection Directive, on 
the other hand, focuses on the activities of the controller itself (in casu the search engine), 
regardless of those of the entity at the source of the information. This approach goes back to the 
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126 Supra, Section 3.2; Recently, Google was explicitly ruled not to have actual knowledge in a case where a victim 
of defamation had issued a takedown request and even obtained a judgment declaring the original content to be 
illegal. See more: C. A. Rigaudias, “Miguel v. Google Inc. Spanish Supreme Court [STS (Civil Chamber) of 4 
March 2013 no. 144/2013] – “The recent judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court addressed the liability of 
intermediary information services providers for defamatory content and sheds light on the so-called ‘right to be 
forgotten’ case being heard by the ECJ”, E-Commerce Law Reports - volume 13 issue 04, p. 11!
127 Clearly, it was a deliberate and strategic decision on Google’s part not to comply with this specific injunction. 
Besides wanting to obtain a more definitive and authoritative answer on whether or not these kind of erasure 
requests should be possible in the first place, Google was probably interested in being elucidated on who will bear 
the costs of compliance. Do search engines (exclusively) bear the burden of assessing removal requests? Or can they 
just defer to the authorities (DPA or Court) to make the appropriate balance? The CJEU seems to suggest a middle-
way, in which search engines can be asked to make a balance, but can easily defer the requester to the relevant 
national authority in more problematic cases (without risking liability).!
128 In this particular case, the original source (LaVanguardia) even had an explicit obligation to publish the 
information.!
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Court of Justice’s Lindqvist129 and Satamedia130 cases. In these cases, the Court emphasized that 
personal data that has been published is still protected by data protection law. Each use of the 
relevant personal data should hence be assessed against data protection law separately. To put 
this differently, the data protection framework – and right to erasure in particular – starts from a 
different paradigm than the liability exemptions in the E-Commerce Directive. The latter is 
hinged upon traditional tort law principles where an individual is subject to (potential) harm 
caused by the publication of certain information. Data protection simply puts certain 
responsibilities on the shoulders of whoever processes personal data. In order to exercise one’s 
rights under the data protection framework, it is not necessary to demonstrate (potential) harm.131!
3. Autonomy 
Contrary to the intermediaries mentioned in Section 4 of the E-Commerce Directive (e.g. 
caching, mere conduit and hosting providers), search engines do not remain purely passive with 
regard to the information they facilitate access to.132 In fact, they do a great deal with this data 
independent from gathering it from its source.133 Based on their algorithmic analysis of the 
information, they refer to certain web pages when entering a particular search term/phrase. A 
strong argument can be made that search engines bear responsibility for this specific activity. 
After all, it determines – entirely autonomously – how and why the information is presented in a 
certain way. But, one could counter-argue that search engines only offer a tool to their users and 
should not be held responsible for the queries these users make.!
In any situation, it is hard to deny the importance of search engines in giving visibility/publicity 
to the information they refer to. In Google Spain, the Court emphasized that search results 
constitute “a structured overview of the information [...] that can be found on the Internet [...] 
and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been 
only with great difficulty – and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile...”.134 While 
this is – of course – one of the main reasons people use search engines in the first place, it is also 
the reason why a search engine has such a potentially important impact on users’ perception of 
the search term. In other words, the harm or impact on the individual might not have occurred (to 
the same extent) if the information had not been accessible through search engines.135 Put briefly, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Court of Justice of the European Union , Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, 6 November 2003,!
130 Court of Justice of the European Union, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia 
Oy, C 73/07, 16 December 2008!
131 Article 23 of the Directive does provide for the possibility to obtain damages in case one is actually harmed.!
132 Intermediary liability exemptions are based on the premise that the ‘sole purpose’ of their activities is to make 
“the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies 
that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is 
transmitted or stored.” (recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive).!
133 For a comprehensive overview, see: Van Alsenoy et al., 11 et seq.This is probably also one of the reasons why 
search engines are not explicitly included in the E-Commerce Directive’s exemption regime in the first place. The 
legislator specifically introduced an article spurring the European Commission to analyse “the need for proposals 
concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool services.” (article 21.2).In the Google Spain 
Case, the Court of Justice emphasized the distinction between the search engine’s and the original publisher’s 
activities at several occasions: Paragraph 80; 84-85; 86-87.!
134 Paragraph 80.!
135 This line of arguments was already put forward by the Spanish DPA in a Statement dating back from December 
2007. Spanish Data Protection Agency, Statement on Internet Search Engines (Madrid, Spain, December 1, 2007), 
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one could draw a direct causal relationship between the search engine’s activities and the impact 
on the individual. Hence, it is not surprising to see the Council of the EU also emphasize that the 
required balancing exercise differs depending on whether it relates to taking down the source or 
a search link.136!
The above is well-illustrated by two Australian cases involving Yahoo!137 and Google.138 In 
these (defamation) cases, the plaintiff successfully established that the search engines’ result 
pages caused him reputational harm. The links, snippets, and photos that were shown when 
searching for the plaintiff’s name – and which were all legal/legitimate on their own – gave the 
impression Mr. Trkulja was a criminal.139 In the same vein, several European courts have 
recognized that – under certain circumstances – Google’s ‘auto-complete’ functionality can 
cause harm to the relevant individual. For example, a German Federal Court recently ruled that 
Google should remove offensive word-combinations upon notification (in casu ‘scientology’).140 
In a comparable and ongoing case, Bettina Wulff (the former First Lady of Germany) has 
demanded that Google cease auto-completion with words such as ‘escort’ and ‘red light district’ 
when entering her name.141 Similarly, an Italian court has ruled Google to be responsible for the 
auto-complete terms ‘truffatore’ (con man, swindler) and ‘truffa’ (scam, fraud).142 Other cases 
against Google’s auto-complete functionality were introduced by companies, seeing their name 
being associated with terms such as ‘receivership’143; ‘crook’144; ‘scam’145; etc.!
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9–10. The DPA stated inter alia that “Although the initial incorporation of this personal information on the web 
‘may be legitimate at source, its universal and secular conservation on the Internet may be disproportionate.’ 
People must have at their disposal reaction instruments in order to avoid, on their own initiative, to be subject to a 
global exhibition.”!
136 Council of the European Union - Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX). “Note 
on the Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation - the Right to Be Forgotten and the Google Judgment,” 
July 3, 2014. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011289%202014%20INIT, 5-6.!
137 Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc LLC & Anor (VSC 2012).!
138 Trkulja v Google Inc LLC & Anor (No 5) (VSC 2012).!
139 More specifically, when looking for the plaintiff’s name, search engine users were presented with pictures of 
criminals with the plaintiff’s name underneath. The results pages also contained a link to an article titled ‘Shooting 
probe urged ...’ aside a big picture of the plaintiff and underneath the heading ‘Melbourne Crime’.!
140 BGH, judgment of 14 May 2013, ref. VI ZR 269/12, available at http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2013&nr=64071&pos=0&anz=86. Also see: 
EDRi. “Germany: Google Must Remove Autocomplete Harmful Searches If Notified,” May 22, 2013. 
edri.org/edrigram/number11.10/autocomplete-harmful-searches-google-germany; “German Federal Court Raps 
Google on the Knuckles over Autocomplete Function | Technology | DW.DE | 15.05.2013,” DW.DE, accessed June 
25, 2013, http://www.dw.de/german-federal-court-raps-google-on-the-knuckles-over-autocomplete-function/a-
16813363.!
141 “Bettina Wulff Will Weiter Gegen Google Vorgehen,” Welt Online, May 20, 2013, sec. Wirtschaft, 
http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article116355211/Bettina-Wulff-will-weiter-gegen-Google-vorgehen.html; “German 
Federal Court Raps Google on the Knuckles over Autocomplete Function | Technology | DW.DE | 15.05.2013.”!
142 EDRi, “Italian Court Found Google Responsible For Search Suggestions To Users,” April 20, 2011, 
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.8/italian-case-google-suggest.!
143 In 2011, an Irish hotel sued Google over the search term suggestion ‘receivership’ (“the legal state of having 
forfeited control of a business or estate to a receiver to allow for the attempted recovery of a debt”). The case was 
later dropped by the Hotel for unclear reasons. See: Rob Young, “Irish Hotel Drops Autocomplete Defamation Case 
Against Google,” Search Engine Watch, November 25, 2011, http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2127329/Irish-
Hotel-Drops-Autocomplete-Defamation-Case-Against-Google.!
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In any situation, the above clearly illustrates the difficulties of categorizing search engines or 
even defining the nature of their activities. It is clear that, on the one hand, they do perform 
autonomous and independent activities on the information, while on the other hand acting as a 
mere intermediary facilitating access to third party content. But it is much less clear whether this 
conceptual distinction can – or even should – be translated into practice.!
C. Aftermath  
Only two weeks after the CJEU’s decision, Google had already put in place an online form, 
allowing individuals to request the removal of links from the results that were produced by a 
search of their name.146 At the same time, the search engine company also announced it would 
create a hand-picked team of experts.147 This ‘advisory council’ will help them define a strategy 
on how to deal with the multitude of requests that they receive, and includes academics, 
policymakers, business people, and journalists.148 More recently, Google also invited the public 
at large to give them feedback on how to implement the ruling.149 Some national data protection 
authorities have issued official reactions to the ruling already150 and the Article 29 Working 
Party151 has already had an internal meeting on the Court’s ruling,152 and sat together with 
several search engines at the end of July.153!
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144 In France, a Court of Appeals confirmed an earlier decision, requiring Google to remove the auto-suggestion, pay 
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Injure - LeMonde.fr,” accessed December 29, 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2011/12/28/google-
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145 Marc Rees, “Google Condamné Pour Avoir Suggéré La Requête,” January 6, 2010, pcinpact.com/news/54815-
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146 https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch&hl=en!
147 Alistair Barr and Rolfe Winkler, “Google Offers ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Form in Europe,” Wall Street Journal, 
May 30, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/google-committee-of-experts-to-deal-with-right-to-be-forgotten-
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148 See: https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/!
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assessment (AEPD, Press Release - The Court of Justice of the European Union supports the thesis of the Spanish 
DPA on search engines and the right to be forgotten online, 13 May 2014, 
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ase_EU_Court_judgement_right_to_be_forgotten1.pdf); the UK’s information Commissioner declared there is an 
important role to be played by national regulators (David Smith (Deputy Commissioner and Director of Data 
Protection, ICO), Four things we learned from the EU Google judgment, 20 May 2014, 
http://iconewsblog.wordpress.com/2014/05/20/four-things-weve-learned-from-the-eu-google-judgment.).!
151 Umbrella organization including the data protection authorities from all EU member states. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/!
152 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Press Release, 23 May 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/20140523_wp29_press_release_ecj_google.pdf!
153 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/20140717_wp29_press_release_meeting_with_search_engines.pdf!
For a complete list of the concrete questions the Working Party asked the search engines, see: Article 29 Working 
Party, “Press Release: European DPAs Meet with Search Engines on the ‘right to Be Forgotten,’” July 25, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/20140725_wp29_press_release_right_to_be_forgotten.pdf.!
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Twenty-four hours after putting the form online where individuals can ask Google to remove 
certain links, the search engine already reported receiving over 12,000 requests. This number 
climbed to 41,000 by early June154 and over 70,000 one month after that.155156 Most requests 
emanated from France, than Germany, Great Britain, and Spain.157 Google declared to regulators 
that it approved over 50% of the requests, asked for more information in about 15%, and rejected 
over 30%.!
At first, the search engine intended to notify its users when their search query would have been 
the subject of an erasure request under the data protection framework (similarly to what it does 
with regard to takedowns in the context of copyright).158 Instead, however, Google now puts a 
disclaimer on the bottom of every search it identifies as a ‘name search’, stating, “Some results 
may have been removed under data protection law in Europe,” with a link to more information 
on the CJEU case. It seems, though, that Google will try to notify the relevant source in certain 
cases. This was clearly illustrated when the Guardian159 and BBC160 published reports that some 
of their articles on corrupt politicians, dodgy bankers, and pedophiles had been de-indexed by 
Google.161 Finally, it should be said that all of the above only occurs within the context of the 
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154 Jennifer Baker, “Google Has Received over 41,000 Requests to ‘Forget’ Personal Information,” Tech Blog, IT 
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a lot of criticism for these takedowns, the company quickly reinstated the references. For more information, see: 
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EU. In other words, the form is not available outside the EU and search results are not filtered 
when queries are made on top-level domain names outside of the EU (e.g. .com; .sn).162!
D. Looking ahead 
It is still too early to draw conclusions about the eventual impact of the Google Spain ruling. 
Further observations and research should make a distinction between first and second order 
effects. First order effects relate to the implementation of the judgment in the EU. Second order 
effects relate to the broader consequences and implications (e.g. on innovation, freedom of 
expression, or the effect of this judgment outside of the EU).!
Data protection regulators – both at the national and pan-European level – are arduously working 
on developing a ‘dashboard’ or ‘platform’ that should ensure a proper balancing between all 
interests at stake.163 A critical element in this exercise is the development of objective criteria 
that could be applied the same across the EU (in order to harmonies the implementation of the 
ruling).164 At this stage, it is worth noting that at least some official organizations (e.g. the 
French data protection authority, CNIL165; and the Council of the EU166) suggest a 
gradual/subsidiary approach where the data subject should first approach the source page before 
being able to go to the search engine.!
Currently, there is still insufficient information to predict the second order effects. For example, 
there is not enough data on specific cases and corresponding compliance rates167 to evaluate the 
impact on the right to freedom of expression, or innovation. As mentioned before, we should be 
prudent in predicting the possible impact of the judgment on the right to freedom of expression. 
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First of all, a search engine’s search results are very dynamic in nature and change constantly 
based on a plethora of factors (of legal,168 economic,169 or technical170 nature) already. Secondly, 
the relevant webpage will still be findable through other – more specific – search terms (not 
including the name) and via other routes (e.g. different search engines, social networks, direct 
access, etc.). After all, we should not (over-)rely on one tool or service to constitute our (sole) 
window to all online information. At the same time, the judgment might encourage certain 
governments outside the EU to introduce more content control. !
Finally, the CJEU’s ruling in Google Spain will undoubtedly have an impact on the currently on-
going legislative reform of the European data protection framework.171 The Court seems to 
prompt legislators to be clearer in defining the distribution of responsibilities among different 
online actors, as well as providing better guidance on the potential conflict with freedom of 
expression (and other fundamental) rights and interests. This was also echoed in the Council of 
the EU’s report on the Google Spain Ruling, specifically calling for the legislator’s attention to 
“(1) the scope of the right [to be forgotten], (2) the grounds on which this right can be exercised, 
(3) the need to balance this right with the freedom of expression, and (4) whether there is still a 
need to impose an effort obligation on initial controllers to inform second controllers of the 
request for erasure of data.”172!
VI. Conclusion 
The EU regime regarding liability of online intermediaries is in need of reform. The planned 
Notice and Action Directive failed to reach the EU Parliament before the 2014 elections. It is to 
be seen whether the review of the intermediary liability regime remains on the agenda of the new 
Commission. !
This working paper made a deep dive into the situation of search engines in the European 
intermediary liability regime, with a particular focus on their position vis-à-vis data protection 
laws. From this analysis it became clear that the situation is far from resolved. First of all, the 
position, role, and scope of activities of search engines is very hard to categorize. Given their 
inherently editorial functions on the content they refer to, they cannot just be compared to more 
‘traditional’ online intermediaries that remain more ‘neutral’ with regard to the content on their 
platforms/networks. The uncertainty about their position is also reflected in the widely diverging 
regulation of these online service providers throughout the EU. This complexity is only 
amplified by the fact that most (of the biggest) search engines are actually U.S. businesses. The 
Google Spain ruling in particular – although focusing specifically on data protection issues – 
highlights the need for a pan-European approach to the regulation of search engines.!
!
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